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Redistribution programs in developing countries often "leak" because local officials do not 
implement programs as the central government intends. We study one approach to reducing 
leakage. In an experiment in over 550 villages, we test whether mailing cards with program 
information to targeted beneficiaries increases the subsidy they receive from a subsidized 
rice program. On net, beneficiaries received 26 percent more subsidy in card villages. 
Ineligible households received no less, so this represents substantially lower leakage.   
                                                          
Contact email: bolken@mit.edu. This project was a collaboration of many people. We thank Nurzanty 
Khadijah, Chaerudin Kodir, Lina Marliani, Purwanto Nugroho, Hector Salazar Salame, and Freida Siregar 
for their outstanding work implementing the project and Alyssa Lawther, Gabriel Kreindler, Wayne 
Sandholtz, He Yang, Gabriel Zucker for excellent research assistance. We thank Mitra Samya, the Indonesian 
National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (particularly Bambang Widianto, Suahasil Nazara, 
Sri Kusumastuti Rahayu, and Fiona Howell), and SurveyMeter (particularly Bondan Sikoki and Cecep 
Sumantri) for their cooperation implementing the project and data collection. This project was financially 
supported by the Australian Government through the Poverty Reduction Support Facility. Jordan Kyle 
acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under Grant No. 
2009082932. This RCT was registered in the American Economic Association Registry for randomized 
control trials under trial number AEARCTR-0000096. All views expressed in the paper are those of the 
authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views any of the many institutions or individuals acknowledged 
here.  
- 1 - 
I. Introduction 
Throughout the developing world, governments face the problem of ensuring that their 
rules and laws are implemented as conceived by local officials who exercise significant 
discretion and whose interests may differ from those of the central government and/or from 
those of the local community.  
Transfer programs, for example, typically have rules about eligibility, benefit 
amounts, application procedures, and the like, but in practice a local official will often have 
substantial leeway in interpreting these rules.  Citizens may not know enough about 
program rules to effectively advocate for their rights under the program.1  As such, many 
experts advocate providing greater information to citizens about their rights under different 
policies and programs in order to improve service delivery (World Bank 2004).  
However, it is not clear that providing citizens more information will actually help: 
citizens may not be able use the information to demand more of their entitlement, local 
leaders may not care about citizen demand or complaints, or citizens may already have 
sufficient information to begin with.2 Whether information empowers citizens is therefore 
an empirical question, but of the 16 experimental and quasi-experimental studies on 
transparency and accountability reviewed by Kosack and Fung (2014), only a few study 
the effects of providing just information.3 
We experimentally test the effect of providing information to citizens in the context 
of Indonesia’s “Raskin” program (“Rice for the Poor”). Raskin is designed – in theory – to 
                                                          
1 As a result, leakages are common, both in government-run programs and those that are supported by foreign 
aid. For example, Niehaus, Atanassova, Bertrand, and Mullainathan (2013) show high leakage rates in India’s 
public distribution system. Nunn and Qian (forthcoming) describe how much of the foreign-supplied food 
aid goes missing; for example, the UN World Food Program has reported that as much as half of their food 
aid sent to Somalia (about $485 million in 2009) went missing (New York Times, 3/9/10).  
2 In addition, providing more information even has the possibility of making things worse because reducing 
the possibility of future illicit rents may motivate a local official to steal more today. Niehaus and Sukhtankar 
(2013) describe these “golden goose” effects in the context of changes in citizen benefits in India’s workfare 
program, NREGA. 
3 For example, Bjorkman and Svensson (2007) show large effects on health of a community-monitoring 
program that brought together community members and health care providers to discuss the health centers 
and create an action plan for change. Thus, it tests both information and coordination at the same time. 
Ravallion, van de Walle, Dutta, and Murgai (2013) find that a 25 minute video on NREGA that was shown 
in 40 villages in India (randomly chosen from 150) increased citizen knowledge, without impacting program 
outcomes. Other studies have tried to measure the effects using quasi-experimental designs. Reinikka and 
Svensson (2004, 2005) find that when the Ugandan government implemented a national advertising 
campaign, schools that were closer to a newspaper outlet received more of the advertised grant. Francken et 
al (2009) show an association between media access and leakages in public expenditures in Madagascar.   
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provide 15 kg of subsidized rice per month (about half of a household’s rice consumption) 
to eligible households. With an annual budget of US$1.5 billion, and a targeted population 
of 17.5 million households, it is Indonesia’s largest targeted transfer program. In practice, 
local officials often do not follow the national rules. In data we introduce below, we find 
that beneficiaries seldom receive their full entitlement and they pay 42 percent more than 
the official copay price—thus, on net, eligible households receive only about one-third of 
the intended subsidy.  
Working with the Government of Indonesia, we designed a set of field experiments 
to provide information directly to eligible households. In 378 villages (randomly selected 
from among 572 villages spread over three provinces), the central government mailed 
“Raskin identification cards” to eligible households to inform them of their eligibility and 
the quantity of rice that they were entitled to. The government also experimentally varied 
how the card program was run along three key dimensions— whether an additional rule 
(the copay price) was also listed on the card, whether information about the beneficiaries 
was also made public, and whether cards were sent to all eligible households or only to a 
subset.  
We surveyed both eligible and ineligible households in all villages, two months, 
eight months, and eighteen months after the cards were mailed. Since the cards could affect 
both the amount of rice received and the price, we focus on understanding the impacts on 
the total subsidy received, defined as the quantity of rice purchased multiplied by the 
difference between the market price of rice and the copay that the household paid.4 We 
also measure individual beliefs about the program, as well as the protests and complaints 
to local leaders, to understand whether citizens gained and used the information. 
On net, across all of the variations of the program, we find that the cards led to a 
large increase in subsidy received by eligible households. Eligible households in treatment 
villages received a 26 percent (std. error: 5 percent) increase in subsidy, stemming from 
both an increase in quantity and a decrease in the copay price.5 Not only did eligible 
                                                          
4Welfare analysis generally focuses on prices rather than quantities because of the envelope-theorem idea 
that small changes in quantities do not matter.  However, in the case, this logic is not appropriate:  the price 
is about one-fifth of the market price and households have excess demand for rice at this price, implying that 
changes in both prices and quantities have first-order effects on welfare.   
5 This is the reduced form effect for eligible households (regardless of card receipt). The implied treatment-
on-treated effect would be thrice as large, assuming no spillovers to those who did not receive a card.  
- 3 - 
households receive more rice, but ineligible ones in total received no less, implying that 
the cards reduced leakage by 1 kg (std. error: 0.46) to 1.6 kg (std. error: 0.55) per eligible 
household, which represents a 33 (std. error: 15 percent) to 58 percent (std. error: 27 
percent) reduction in leakage. This occurred despite imperfect implementation: eligible 
households in treatment villages were only 30 percentage points more likely to have 
received a card relative to the control.  
Importantly, the information listed on the card mattered:  Printing the copay price 
nearly doubled the additional subsidy eligible households received relative to the effect of 
providing a card without the copay information.  
If the intervention puts too much pressure on the local leaders to reduce leakage 
and satisfy all eligible households, they might be unable or unwilling to implement the 
program at all.6 The central government therefore also implemented an alternative 
intervention where the cards were only mailed to the bottom decile of households, rather 
than the bottom 30 percent who are typically eligible, thereby offering the leader more 
“flexibility” in his or her decisions.7 This treatment arm was no more effective than full 
distribution of the cards: Households who received cards experienced the same increase in 
subsidy regardless of whether everyone else received them. Eligible households that were 
assigned not to receive a card – and ineligible households – saw no change in subsidy 
relative to in the control areas. 
Another reason why information could be counterproductive is that deviations from 
program rules may have been for purely altruistic reasons. The government’s list of eligible 
households is known to be imperfect and socially-minded village leaders may deliberately 
deviate from it in order to include the poor excluded households (Alatas et al. 2012). In 
this case, if information compels the leaders to comply with the government’s list, welfare 
may actually fall. In practice, this was not the case: poor, ineligible households were no 
                                                          
6 For example, in the past, protests about errors in the targeting list led some village leaders to resign rather 
than defend the beneficiary lists to their constituents: over 2,000 village officials refused to participate in a 
new government transfer program for this reason  (See, for example, “BLT Bisa Munculkan Konflik Baru” 
(BLT may create new conflicts), Kompas, May 17, 2008; “Kepala Desa Trauma BLT” (A village head’s 
trauma with BLT), Kompas, May 24, 2008; “Ribuan Perangkat Desa Tolak Salurkan BLT” (Thousands of 
village officials refuse to distribute BLT), Kompas, May 22, 2008; and “DPRD Indramayu Tolak BLT” 
(District parliament of Indramayu refuses BLT), Kompas, May 24, 2008.).   
7 The full beneficiary list that was given to the village head was identical in both treatments. Therefore, the 
leader’s information about who is eligible was the same and only the citizens’ information was varied. 
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less likely to receive the rice as a result of the cards.  
 The experiment also allows us to test the effect of public relative to private 
information about benefit entitlement. In half of the card villages (randomly selected), the 
beneficiary list was posted all over the villages and information about the cards was played 
on the village mosque loudspeaker (“public information”), in addition to mailing out the 
cards (“standard information”). Eligible households in the public information villages 
received twice as much additional subsidy as they did under the cards treatment with the 
standard information only. Part of this effect may have been driven by the fact that 
households were more likely to receive their cards, but we show that even conditional upon 
receipt, cards had a much larger effect in public information villages relative to those 
villages that received standard information. While public information increased everyone’s 
knowledge about their own eligibility status, this treatment appears to have also promoted 
second order knowledge; for example, it also made citizens of all types more conscious of 
the fact that others knew about the official eligibility list. These results suggest that public 
information could have made it easier for villagers who were being denied their rights to 
coordinate with others in trying to get redress. 
 There are several possible mechanisms that could explain these results. Is it that 
information empowered citizens to better negotiate with local leaders for their fair share?  
Or does the information reduce the social stigma of transfer programs by legitimizing the 
entitlement and therefore encourage citizens to become more aggressive about claiming 
their rights?  Is the information just a signal that local governments will be monitoring local 
leaders more?  While it is challenging to identify a single mechanism that drives the result 
– and, indeed, the results could be driven by a combination of these mechanisms – we show 
that the data is consistent with the explanation of citizens having better negotiating power.  
 Several pieces of evidence support the idea that bargaining is at least one important 
channel through which cards are improving outcomes. For example, we show, in the 
context of a simple bargaining model, that providing information can affect how citizens 
engage with local leaders; indeed, empirically we find an increase in protests in cards 
villages. Moreover, we find that impact of printing the copay price on the cards was driven 
by an increase in the quantity of rice that eligible households received, rather than a 
reduction in the price paid. This is consistent with a bargaining model, where officials and 
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villagers care only about the total subsidy that the villagers would receive. The price 
information appears to have changed the subsidy along the more cost-effective margin for 
the local leaders, changing the quantity just for eligible households, for example, rather 
than changing the price for all households. This is harder to reconcile with other stories, 
such as a perceived increase in monitoring by the central government, because that should 
have increased compliance with the law (i.e. charging the right price). 
In short, these findings strongly argue for the view that information about citizens’ 
rights is very scarce, at least in poor populations, in developing countries, even when the 
rules have existed for a long time. Thus, providing information can be a powerful tool to 
improve service delivery. Just providing information directly to beneficiary households 
had a large effect on their ability to receive their entitlements, and it does so in a cost 
effective manner: the cards yield an increase in subsidy received by households greater 
than 7 times their cost, even under the assumption that effects last only eighteen months.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the setting, 
experimental design and data. Section III provides the main findings on the effects of the 
card program. Section IV tests the idea of whether “too much” information may potentially 
backfire, while Section V explores the effect of additionally providing public information. 
Section VI discusses potential mechanisms that may drive the results.  Section VII 
concludes. 
II. Setting, Experimental Design and Data 
A. Setting 
This project explores the impact of providing information to citizens within Indonesia’s 
subsidized rice program, known as “Raskin” (Rice for the Poor). Introduced in 1998, by 
2012, the program targeted 17.5 million low-income households (the poorest 30 percent) 
based on a proxy-means test that is updated every three years. Targeted households are 
allowed to purchase 15 kg of rice–about half of a typical household’s monthly rice 
consumption–at a copay price of Rp. 1,600 per kg (US$0.15), about one-fifth of the market 
price. The intended subsidy value—about 4 percent of beneficiary households’ monthly 
consumption—is substantial. It is Indonesia’s largest permanent, targeted social assistance 
program: in 2012, the budget for Raskin was over US$1.5 billion, and it distributed 3.41 
million tons of subsidized rice (Indonesian Budget 2012). 
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 The Raskin program is implemented at the local level by local officials appointed 
by the head of the local government. Indonesian villages (known as desa), and their urban 
equivalents (known as kelurahan), can have one of two systems of government. In desa 
governments, which tend to be in rural areas, the head of the government, known as the 
kepala desa (literally: village head), is elected, usually for 5 year terms. Kepala Desa, 
during the period of our study, were largely compensated in the form of usufruct rights 
over village land reserved for this purpose (known in Java, for example, as tanah bengkok). 
These elections are quite competitive.8 In kelurahan governments, which tend to be in more 
urban areas (and are required for all districts that are formally recognized cities, known as 
kotamadya), the head of government is the lurah, who is a civil servant appointed by the 
directly-elected district head, and who receives a civil service salary. We hereafter refer to 
both kepala desa and lurah as “village heads” for simplicity. Our sample consists of 
approximately 70% desa and 30% kelurahan, roughly mirroring the rural/urban split of our 
sample. 
Typically, the village head appoints one villager to be sub-head for people’s welfare 
(Kepala Urusan Kesejahteraan Rakyat, or Kaur Kesra).9 This individual is in charge of 
picking up the rice once a month from the central distribution point (either in the nearby 
subdistrict or in the district capital), collecting copays from households, setting up a 
location where households can receive the rice (either in the village office or in each 
neighborhood), and remitting copays to the central government. There is little central 
government oversight, so local officials have substantial de facto control over 
implementation of the program at the local level. Our sample villages have an average of 
336 eligible households, which means that the distribution team is typically responsible for 
distributing about 5 tons of rice per month. 
Beneficiaries, however, do not necessarily receive all of the intended benefits. 
Leakages are abundant – a substantial amount of rice disappears (Olken 2006; World Bank 
                                                          
8 In a previous survey conducted in 2009 in Indonesia by Olken, Onishi, and Wong (2014), we found that 
incumbent village heads chose to run for re-election only 40 percent of the time. Conditional on running for 
re-election, incumbents won only 59 percent of the time. Given this, being re-elected as village head is far 
from a sure thing. 
9 Exactly which local officials are in charge of Raskin distribution within the village varies by village. In 
93% of villages in the sample, a combination of the village head, other village officers (i.e. village secretary), 
and neighborhood heads are in charge of Raskin distribution.  
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2012). Targeting is also a problem: the local officials who administer the distribution have 
a high degree of de facto discretion over who can access it. Local officials distribute Raskin 
more widely than the central government intends: 63 percent of the officially ineligible 
households in our control group had purchased Raskin rice at least once in the last two 
months.10 This means that eligible households cannot purchase their full entitlement: 83 
percent of eligible households in our control group reported that they wanted to buy more 
Raskin rice during the last distribution. Of these, 84 percent say that local Raskin officials 
prevented them from doing so.11 Third, the local leaders often inflate the copay, with 
eligible households paying 42 percent above the official price. While this may reflect the 
fact that local leaders bear real transport costs for the distribution (e.g. truck rentals, storage 
space) that are not covered by the central government, qualitative research (Smeru 2008) 
and our own estimates (reported in Banerjee et al. 2015) suggest that this higher price often 
exceeds these costs. Putting this together, eligible households receive only a third of the 
intended subsidy.  
 Existing research suggests that, while Raskin is a highly salient and well-known 
program, intended beneficiaries have little information on program rules and beneficiary 
status (Smeru 2008; World Bank 2012). This means they may not realize that they are 
receiving a low share of their intended subsidy. In our sample, only 30 percent of the 
beneficiaries know that they are on the official eligibility list, and the average eligible 
household believes that the official copay price is 13 percent higher than the true price. 
On the one hand, it is surprising that citizen information is so low for such an 
established program. However, government efforts to publicize the program (what is called 
“socialization” in the Indonesian context) have focused on the local officials that 
implement the program rather than on the citizens (Smeru 2008; World Bank 2012). 
Moreover, the fact that there are legitimate reasons for deviations from program rules 
muddies the waters. For example, the fact that distribution costs are not covered by the 
central government provides an excuse to raise prices beyond the copay amount. However, 
                                                          
10 There is a long history of local deviations from official eligibility lists in Raskin and its predecessor 
programs (Olken et al. 2001; Olken 2006). Alatas et al. (2013) show that these changes to beneficiary lists 
by local leaders likely happens during the distribution of the rice, rather than through the determination of 
the official eligibility lists.  
11 By contrast, only 19 percent of households in control villages in our sample report that they could not buy 
more Raskin rice because they were credit-constrained at the time of distribution. 
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villagers may not know how large an increase can be justified by this argument, allowing 
officials to pad the amount. Similarly, the fact that some poor households are indeed 
excluded from official eligibility lists due to the inevitable errors in the implementation of 
proxy-means tests (Alatas et al. 2012) means that there is a legitimate (and legally allowed) 
reason to take some rice from the eligible and give it to the ineligible. Once that occurs, 
and eligible households are not getting the full 15 kg allotment they are supposed to, it 
requires careful checking to make sure that all the rice is redistributed properly and that 
none leaks out. Given that these deviations include both legitimate and illegitimate 
deviations from program rules, it is important to check not only whether the interventions 
increase compliance with program rules, but whether they do so by reducing leakage or at 
the expense of legitimate deviations (i.e. helping the poor). We explore these issues in the 
empirical work below. 
 
B. Sample 
This project was carried out in six districts (two each in the provinces of Lampung, South 
Sumatra, and Central Java). Importantly, the districts are spread out across Indonesia—
specifically, on and off Java–in order to capture important heterogeneity in culture and 
institutions (Dearden and Ravallion 1988). Due to the constrained timeframe for providing 
feedback into national policy, we chose to conduct the experiment in villages where we 
had previously worked and thus had household-level data that could serve as a baseline 
survey.12 Thus, we stratified the treatment assignments in this project based on status in 
the previous experiment to ensure balance.  
 Within these districts, we had originally randomly sampled 600 villages. We 
dropped 28 unsafe villages prior to conducting the randomization, for a final sample of 572 
villages (40 percent urban and 60 percent rural villages).  
C.  Experimental Design 
As shown in Figure 1, out of the 572 villages in the sample, we chose 378 to receive the 
Raskin cards.  In the 194 remaining control villages, the government continued to run the 
                                                          
12 The previous experiment was on an unrelated conditional Cash Transfer Program, known as PKH, targeted 
at the very poorest population and administered through a different ministry and funds distribution program 
(see Alatas et al. 2016 for a description of the previous experiment).  
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program under the status quo. The government mailed a soft-copy beneficiary list to 
districts with instructions to send one hard copy to the village government. The government 
also mailed an informational packet on program rules directly to village governments, 
including instructions to publically post the beneficiary list and to distribute rice only to 
those on the list. In these villages, households did not receive Raskin identification cards 
or any other form of information from the central government. 
 In the 378 card villages, the central government did everything they did in the 
control villages, but also mailed out “Raskin cards,” along with instructions on how to use 
them, to beneficiary households via the postal service. Figure 2 shows an example of a 
card, which contains the household’s identifying information plus instructions that they are 
entitled to receive 15 kg of subsidized rice per month. Postmen delivered the cards directly 
to households when possible; however, as in most developing countries, the postal service 
has a limited ability to do so, particularly in rural areas. As such, only 15 percent of the 
households that received a card reported receiving it directly from a postal worker; the rest 
received it from local officials.  
We explore three variants of the cards’ treatment.13 First, in 187 randomly chosen 
card villages, the government printed the copay price on the card (see Figure 2). In the 
remaining villages, it was not printed. The quantity of rice households were entitled to (15 
kg) was printed in both cases.  
Second, in half the card villages (randomly selected), all eligible households (on 
average, 30 percent of the village for our sample) received cards. In the remaining card 
villages, cards were only mailed to those in the lowest decile of predicted per capita 
household consumption (32 percent of eligible households, or, on average, 14 percent of 
the whole village for our sample). The other eligible households were still on the lists and 
posters provided to the local officials and they were still eligible to receive Raskin despite 
                                                          
13 The government also administered a fourth intervention where the government mailed coupons to 
beneficiaries, along with the cards. Local officials were supposed to collect the coupon each month when a 
beneficiary bought Raskin rice, and send the coupons to the central government, which was supposed to 
check them. The intervention was designed to test whether additional “monitoring” by the central government 
resulted in less leakage. However, in fact, the central government did not actually tabulate the coupons they 
received, or follow up based on the coupons or lack thereof. We show in the Appendix Tables 1A and 1B 
that in fact, the coupons increased the bargaining power of the official relative to ineligible households, as 
officials were able to deny ineligible households access to the program, but did not increase access to eligible 
ones. 
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not having a card.  
Finally, we experimentally varied the degree to which information was public. In 
192 villages (randomly chosen) that received cards, additional public information, beyond 
the status quo information, was provided regarding both the presence of the cards and 
eligibility. The goal was to not only increase knowledge of one’s own eligibility status, but 
to also increase common knowledge within the village. To this end, a community facilitator 
hung up additional posters – announcing the cards and publicizing the beneficiary lists – 
within different neighborhoods of the “public” villages. They also played a pre-recorded 
announcement about the cards in the local language over the village mosque loudspeaker 
(a common advertising technique in Indonesia).14 The facilitator spent about two days in 
each village, and the marginal cost of this additional information was only about US$1.40 
per beneficiary household.15 
D. Randomization Design, Timing, and Data 
Figure 1 shows the number of villages randomly assigned to each treatment. For the 
assignments of control, card, and card only to the bottom decile, we stratified by 58 
geographic strata (sub-districts) interacted with the previous experimental treatments. For 
the price and public information sub-treatments, we stratified by district, previous 
experimental treatments, and cards.  
 Figure 3 shows the timeline of the experiment. In July 2012, the central government 
mailed the program guidelines and the new list of eligible households to local governments. 
In August, the government mailed the cards to eligible households in card treatment 
villages. In September and October, the additional public information treatment was 
conducted in the villages that were randomly assigned to receive it. 
E. Data Collection 
We conducted two primary follow-up surveys: one in October to November 2012, at least 
two months after cards were mailed, and a second in March to April 2013, about eight 
                                                          
14 Appendix Figure 1 shows an example of the posters used to announce the cards. There were eight variants 
of the poster to reflect the combinations of the sub-treatments: with and without price, with and without 
coupons, and distributed to all eligible households or only to the bottom decile.  
15 The facilitators had a coordination meeting with the village leaders to gain permission to hang up the 
posters. The meetings were attended by few households (an average of 20 out of 1,380 households in a 
village) and they were short; the facilitators were instructed to stay on script and not provide program 
information. So, it is highly unlikely that information was widely spread directly as a result of the meeting. 
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months afterwards. In both surveys, SurveyMeter, an independent survey organization, 
visited randomly selected households and asked them about their experience with Raskin, 
as well as other characteristics. We oversampled eligible households to ensure sufficient 
power for this group. In the second survey, we also sampled some respondents who had 
been surveyed in our previous experiment (Alatas et al. forthcoming), to take advantage of 
pre-treatment information. Additional sampling details can be found in Appendix 1. 
 We also conducted a third follow-up survey in December 2013 to January 2014, 
18 months after the intervention, to be used as the endline survey for another experiment 
that we conducted after this one (see Banerjee et al. 2015). In July 2013, prior to the 18-
month survey but after our second (8 month) survey, the government distributed new 
cards nationwide (i.e. in both the control and treatment areas) for all social protection 
programs. While the new social protection cards were officially to be used for all 
programs, including Raskin, the publicity surrounding the social protection cards was 
heavily focused on a new temporary cash transfer program that was rolled out 
concurrently and there was comparatively little information about the Raskin program.16 
Thus, we report the results of this endline separately to shed light on longer term effects 
of the original Raskin card, with the caveat that these 18 month results may have been 
affected by these other interventions. 
 
F. Summary Statistics and Experimental Validity 
Appendix Table 2 provides sample statistics from the control villages to provide a 
description of Raskin in the absence of the intervention. On average, 79 percent of eligible 
households bought Raskin in the last two months; however, 63 percent of the ineligible 
households did so as well. Eligible households typically bought only a third of their official 
allotment (5.3 kg out of 15 kg) at an average price of Rp. 2,276, over 40 percent higher 
than the official copay price of Rp. 1,600. Combined, this implies that the eligible 
households received an average subsidy of Rp. 28,605, or 32 percent of their entitlement 
                                                          
16 This final endline reveals that 91 percent of eligible households in treatment areas and 93 percent in control 
areas received a Social Protection Card mailed out in July 2013. However, while 99 percent of card recipients 
report that the Social Protection Card was used for the cash transfer program, just 1 percent report it was used 
for Raskin. These percentages are similar in treatment and control group.  
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(Rp. 88,680).17 Seven percent of eligible and 5 percent of ineligible households report 
having a card for Raskin in the control group, which may be because a few local 
governments had previously issued cards. 
 Appendix Table 3 provides the randomization check for the main card treatment, 
and Appendix Table 4 provides the check for card variants. The variables were specified 
prior to the randomization. Only 2 out of 20 differences in Appendix Table 3 and only two 
out of 30 differences shown in Appendix Table 4 are significant at the 10 percent level, 
consistent with chance, suggesting the experimental groups are balanced.  
III. Overall Impact of Information 
A. Did Households Receive the Cards? 
We begin by examining whether households in the card treatment villages received the 
cards, and whether this intervention translated to increased knowledge of eligibility status. 
Table 1 provides the results. Unless otherwise noted, we estimate:  
𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 + 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 + 𝜖𝜖𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 
where 𝑘𝑘 represents a stratum, 𝑠𝑠 represents a type of household sampled, 𝑡𝑡 represents a 
survey round, 𝑣𝑣 represents a village, and 𝑖𝑖 represents a household. Since the results are 
similar across survey rounds, we pool them for most of the analysis, but we also provide 
the disaggregated analysis below. We include sample dummies interacted with the survey 
round dummy, as well as stratum fixed effects.18 Each column comes from a separate OLS 
regression of the respective outcome on the treatment, with standard errors clustered by 
village; we provide p-values from randomization inference in brackets.19  In Columns 1-3, 
the sample is eligible households (those who were on the official central government list), 
while in columns 4-6 the sample is ineligible households (randomly selected households 
                                                          
17 The total subsidy is the difference between the prevailing local market price for rice of similar quality and 
the copay price multiplied by the quantity purchased. 
18 Appendix Table 5 replicates the specifications in Table 1, with varying levels of controls; the results are 
near identical with either no or additional controls. Appendix Table 6 shows that the sample weights do not 
drive the results. Appendix Table 7 shows that the eligible households in Java were more likely to receive 
the card than those off Java. However, even off Java, where we expect weaker institutions, there is a strong 
and positive effect on card receipt for eligible households (Column 1).  
19 To construct randomization-inference p-values, we re-ran our original randomization code 1,000 times 
with different seed values to construct alternative pseudo-randomizations that completely reflect 
stratification and other elements of our randomization design. We use these pseudo-randomizations to 
construct randomization-inference p-values. 
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who were not on that list).20 The last row provides randomization-inference p-values 
comparing the coefficients of eligible and ineligible households for each respective 
variable. Note that the 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 variable is defined based on the randomization results, 
irrespective of whether cards were actually distributed in the village or not, so all 
regressions that we report in the paper estimate intent-to-treat effects. 
Eligible households in the treatment group were 30 percentage points more likely 
to receive the cards than those in the control villages (Column 1 in Table 1). Households 
may not receive cards if they get lost in the mail system or if addresses are difficult to 
access. Moreover, village leaders have the power to block the distribution of cards because, 
in most rural areas, the post office does not know households’ addresses, and instead relies 
on local leaders to help postmen identify who lives where. Anecdotally, in a number of 
cases, when the facilitators arrived at the village for the public information treatment, they 
found that the cards were still in a drawer in the village head’s office, undistributed, 
suggesting that indeed village heads may have been blocking their distribution. This 
blocking was likely happening in practice, as we observe that  households were more likely 
to receive cards in areas that were seen as “lower corruption” areas at baseline (Appendix 
Table 8).  
In comparison to the eligible households, ineligible households in the treatment 
group were only 3 percentage points more likely to receive cards (Column 4); the difference 
between eligible and ineligible households is significant at the 1 percent level. Ineligible 
households may receive cards for a variety of reasons—corruption, reallocations at the 
village level of slots from poor to rich, imperfect matching of the survey data to government 
rolls, and so forth – but the overall level is dramatically lower than those who were eligible.  
 All cards included instructions that the card was to be presented when Raskin was 
purchased. In villages where the cards were mailed out, card use increased: eligible 
households were 15 percentage points more likely to use a card to purchase Raskin rice. 
Note that even if one did not use it, the act of getting a card may still be important. In fact, 
                                                          
20 As already noted, for some randomly selected card villages, the cards were mailed only to households in 
the bottom decile. For these villages, only households that were mailed a card are included in the eligible 
sample; those who are eligible for the Raskin program, but who were not mailed a card, are dropped from 
the main analysis (we explore their outcomes in below). We reweight the regressions so that, on average, the 
weighted fraction of households from the two types of eligible households (bottom decile and other eligible) 
are identical in treatment and control areas in each of the 58 geographic strata.  
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in qualitative interviews some households explained that they were told to simply store the 
card with their important documents rather than use it.  
We then ask whether the card treatment increased people’s beliefs about their 
eligibility.21 Eligible households were 9 percentage points, or 30 percent (std. error: 7 
percent) compared to the control mean, more likely to correctly know their eligibility status 
in the treatment group than the control (Column 3). Similarly, the ineligible were 5 
percentage points, or 14 percent (std. error: 6 percent) compared to the control mean, more 
likely to know their status in the treatment villages (Column 6).22 This suggests that the 
cards increased information, and in particular, increased eligible households’ beliefs about 
what they were entitled to.  
B. Impacts of Card on Distribution Outcomes 
Table 2 explores the impact of the cards on the purchase of Raskin rice in the two months 
prior to the survey, quantity, price paid, and the overall subsidy received. The sample 
structure and regression specifications are the same as in Table 1.23 The quantity and 
subsidy variables are coded as zero if no purchase was made and thus capture both the 
intensive and extensive treatment effects. Price, however, is conditional on purchase, since 
it is unobserved for households that do not purchase rice.  
The card treatment substantially increases the subsidy received by eligible 
households. While they were no more likely to buy Raskin in the last two months (Column 
1 in Table 2), we observe large changes in both quantity and price: eligible households in 
card villages bought 1.25 kg more rice and paid a copay price of Rp. 57 less than control 
villages (Columns 2-3). This translates to a Rp. 7,455—or about a 26 percent—increase in 
subsidy received (Column 4).    
These findings are not likely to be driven by reporting or recall error. For example, 
one might be concerned it is hard to distinguish a 1.2 kg difference in rice – although this 
                                                          
21 The mean for this variable is low for both eligible and ineligibles; this is because many households of both 
types answer “don’t know,” which we code as not knowing their status.  
22 All of the increase in ineligibles’ knowledge comes from public information villages, with no change in 
ineligibles’ information in standard information villages (Table 7). 
23 Appendix Table 9 and 10, respectively, show that the results are near identical regardless of adding or 
removing controls and in dropping the sample weights. Note that eligible household received larger subsidy 
in Java than off-Java (Appendix Table 11) and in “low-corruption” areas at baseline (Appendix Table 12), 
consistent with treatment households in these types of areas being more likely to receive cards.  
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difference is proportionally quite large – and therefore the fact that households say that 
they purchase more rice in treatment villages is based on a misperception. This would be 
true, for example, if leaders responded to the cards by telling everyone that rice sacks 
contained 6.5 kg of rice, while still giving them only 5.3 kg. To check this, we separately 
tested whether households could accurately assess the quantity of rice, and found that 
households were easily able to detect an extra 1 kg of rice in a sack.24 We also find 
qualitatively similar treatment effects if we constrain the sample to areas where village 
officials weigh the Raskin rice in front of you, where villagers directly observe the quantity 
they are receiving rather than having to guess its weight (see Appendix Table 15).  
Alternatively, while one may be concerned that the results are due to recall bias, we 
find that if we restrict the answers to distributions in the last month, where recall is most 
likely less of an issue, we find qualitatively very similar results (Appendix Table 14). 
Moreover, recall bias could not fully explain the fact that the variations of the card 
treatment that we discuss below (i.e. cards with and without price printed on them) had 
differential effects since everyone received a card in that case.  Finally, let us add that 
qualitatively, we have observed that Raskin distributions are extremely salient to 
households. Rice in general plays a central role in Indonesian communities, and Raskin is 
the main government rice program. In our experience, households have no problem 
remembering precisely when the last Raskin distribution took place, how much rice they 
received, or the price they paid. 
 Ineligibles in the card villages were 6 percentage points less likely to purchase 
Raskin in the last two months than those in control villages (Column 5). However, there is 
no treatment effect on the total amount purchased by ineligibles (Column 6), since the card 
treatment increased the quantity conditional on purchase for the ineligibles (Appendix 
Table 16). Thus, on net, there was no effect on the subsidy received by ineligible 
                                                          
24 Specifically, we asked 18 eligible households in two different sample villages to guess the weights of 4 
packets of rice (in random order) that weighed 4, 6, 7, and 8 kg. Respondents assessed packet weight with 
remarkable accuracy, guessing an average of 3.9, 5.5, 7.9, and 8.7 kg respectively. Most importantly, 
respondents consistently assessed the relative packet weights accurately. In a regression, where each 
respondent represents 4 observations (for each packet guess) and the standard errors are clustered by 
respondent, dummies for actual packet weight are highly significant (p-value=0.000), as are the estimated 
differences in weights between packets of size 6 and 7 kg and between 6 and 8 kg (p-value=0.000), showing 
that eligible households can accurately assess differences of the size of the observed treatment effects. See 
Appendix Table 13. 
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households (Column 8). The standard errors are such that the upper bound 95 percent 
confidence interval allows us to rule out an effect greater than about 13 percent of the mean 
subsidy level for ineligibles. As shown in the last row of Table 2, we can rule out that the 
treatment effects of eligible and ineligible households are the same. 
Since the cards increased the quantity received by eligible households, but did not 
decrease the quantity received by ineligibles, this implies that on net, the cards resulted in 
a substantial reduction in leakages. We estimate that the cards reduce leakage by 1 kg (std. 
error: 0.46) to 1.6 kg (std. error: 0.55) per eligible household, which represents a 33 (std. 
error: 15 percent) to 58 percent (std. error: 27 percent) reduction in “lost” rice.25  
Finally, we estimate the treatment effect of cards by survey round, i.e. at the two, 
eight and eighteenth month mark of the program.26 As shown in the control means in Table 
3, despite fluctuations of the program functioning over time (e.g. in both quantity and 
price), the estimates suggest that the card impact is remarkably persistent. The difference 
in subsidy for the eligibles, while larger in the first period (7,470 in the first round as 
compared to 4,538 in the second), is not statistically different across the two survey rounds. 
Remarkably, the treatment effect on the subsidy remains positive, large in magnitude, and 
significant at the 1 percent level 18 months after the intervention.  
C. Impact of an Additional Piece of Information 
The cards contained both individual-specific components – it was pre-printed with the 
names of household members to officially document program eligibility – as well as 
general information (the quantity of rice that eligible households can purchase). To isolate 
the role of a single piece of general-purpose information, the government randomly varied 
                                                          
25 We estimate the reduction in leakage using a “gap measurement” method, similar to Olken (2006). We 
use administrative data from the Government of Indonesia on the size of the Raskin quota for the village. 
Then, we use household data on Raskin rice purchases to estimate the total amount of Raskin rice that 
“arrived” in the village; to arrive at the village-level estimate, we weight eligible and ineligible households 
based on their proportion in the village population. We derive a range of estimates for amount of Raskin 
rice that is purchased by households because there is measurement error in the value of the total number of 
households in the village. We measure the village population using three sources: the first round 
community survey with the village head, the second round community survey with the village head, and 
PODES 2011, a census of all villages in Indonesia collected by the Government of Indonesia. We calculate 
leakage as the difference between the village’s Raskin quota and the estimates of the total amount of 
Raskin purchased within the village. We present the upper and lower bound estimates for leakage 
throughout the paper. 
26 We sampled slightly different sets of households in each survey round. We restrict analysis to a comparable 
sample and weight respondents in the 2nd and 3rd rounds to match the proportions in the first. 
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whether the copay price (Rp. 1,600 per kg) was printed on the card across villages. In all 
villages, the official program rules distributed to village leaders contained the official 
copay, so this is purely an intervention affecting the information received by villagers.  
The results, provided in Table 4, show that just a single additional piece of 
information on the cards had a substantial effect: eligible households in the villages where 
the official price was printed on the card received a much larger increase in subsidy than 
in villages where it was not.27 The difference is primarily through quantity, rather than 
price. Specifically, eligible households receive Rp. 3,602 more subsidy per month with the 
printed price than without; of this Rp. 3,602 increase in subsidy, about 94 percent of the 
change was due to increase in quantity received (which increased by 0.62 kg compared to 
cards without price) while only about 5 percent of the change was due to a reduction in the 
copay price (which fell by Rp. 43 compared to cards without price).28  
IV.  Can Information Backfire? 
In the previous section, we showed that information improved outcomes.  However, a 
potential concern – both in theory and voiced in practice by the Indonesian government – 
is that that “too much information” could be counterproductive, for two distinct reasons.  
One potential issue is that local leaders may deviate from the program rules for 
purely altruistic reasons. The program’s primary objective was to distribute rice to the poor. 
However, the government’s official eligibility list is based on assets, which are a good, but 
imperfect, measure of poverty. One could imagine a benevolent village head redistributing 
from eligible to ineligible households to correct errors and ensure that the poor, ineligible 
households are taken care of. The cards intervention could prevent him from making these 
types of desirable transfers.  
In Table 5, we test whether the card treatment shifted resources away from poor 
households, as measured by their per capita consumption prior to the experiment. We 
                                                          
27 In addition, Appendix Table 18 shows while printing the price did not affect receipt of cards, it did increase 
the probability cards were used. We also tested the effect of the cards in the standard information versus 
public information treatments, since the public information may have had an effect on people’s perception 
of price (Appendix Table 19). We find that the effect of printing the price on cards is similar across both. 
28 Since price is only available conditional on buying Raskin, the sample of people reporting prices may 
change in response to the treatment. Thus, we also report regressions on the minimum and maximum price 
reported by any of our respondents in the village. Appendix Table 20 suggests that, relative to pure controls, 
the cards with printed price reduce the maximum printed price in the village by about Rp. 110, or about 12 
percent of the control group levels of price markups above the official Rp. 1,600 copay price. 
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interact the treatment with baseline log per capita consumption (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘) 
and estimate: 
𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 + 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 + 𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 + 
𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 + 𝜖𝜖𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 
The first 4 columns of Table 5 show that, for eligible households, we find no 
evidence that the gain in subsidy received is concentrated among the rich; if anything, the 
treatment effect is smaller for those with higher income, albeit not statistically significant 
(Column 4). Similarly, the remaining columns show no evidence that poorer ineligible 
households are hurt as a result of the cards. 
A second reason why the government was concerned is that too much information 
may have perverse effects on the incentives of the leaders. This is because the information, 
by putting pressure on the local leaders to deliver more to the villagers, reduces the rents 
that the village head can hold on to and thereby makes him less interested in continuing to 
administer the program. As a result, providing information to fewer individuals may 
actually improve outcomes for all eligible households, since the leader now has the 
flexibility to satisfy a smaller group and protect more of his rents.29  
To examine the tradeoff between providing information to all and providing 
information to some, the government experimentally varied whether cards were mailed out 
to all eligible households or just to those in the bottom decile (about 32 percent of eligible 
households). In these villages, as in all treatment villages, the government mailed the 
complete eligibility list to the local leaders (and not just the list of eligible people in the 
bottom decile) with instructions that all eligible households be allowed to purchase their 
Raskin allotment.  
To examine the impacts, we split our sample of “eligible” households into two 
groups, those in the bottom decile (who receive cards in all card treatment villages) and 
other eligible households (who do not receive cards where cards are mailed only to the 
bottom decile, but receive cards when they are mailed to all eligible households). We 
regress each outcome on indicator variables for “cards to the bottom decile” and “cards to 
all,” and thus the coefficients reflect differences from the “no card” villages. Table 6 
                                                          
29 To see this theoretically, please see Appendix 4. 
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provides these findings for each of the three categories of households.30 
This treatment did reduce pressure on the local leaders: overall protests were 
significantly lower in the villages where cards were only given to the bottom decile rather 
than when cards were given to all (Appendix Table 22). However, providing cards to just 
the bottom decile did not change the allocation to these households relative to villages in 
which all households received cards: there was no detectable difference in the propensity 
to buy Raskin rice, the amount purchased, the price or the subsidy for those in the bottom 
decile across the two types of villages (Columns 1-4 of Table 6).   
However, the outcomes for the other eligible households greatly differed based on 
whether or not they resided in “cards to all” villages, despite the fact that they were on the 
beneficiary list in both types of villages. The other eligible households in the “cards to all” 
received an increase in subsidy that was just as large as that of bottom decile households 
under “cards to all” (Columns 4 vs 8 of Table 6). Other eligible households that resided in 
villages where only the bottom decile received a card, by comparison, did not experience 
any gains (Column 5-8 of Table 6).  
In short, we find no evidence that the additional information “backfired,” either by 
reducing the ability of local leaders to “fix” bad national rules, or by placing so much 
pressure upon them that they actually misbehaved more.  
 
V.  The Effects of Providing Public Information 
The discussion thus far has focused on private information: providing a card to an eligible 
household informing the recipient of what he or she is entitled to. However, it is also 
possible that providing public information, both about the existence of the cards and the 
information they contain, may matter – either by making sure that the cards are actually 
distributed, or by creating common knowledge about the cards and hence more scope for 
collective action. 
To explore these issues, in half of the card villages (randomly selected), the 
government conducted the “standard” card procedures: local leaders received the 
                                                          
30 Appendix Table 21 shows the impact on card receipt, use, and knowledge. Card receipt and knowledge is 
identical for bottom decile households in both types of villages but only increases for other eligible in “cards 
to all” villages.  
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beneficiary list and were told to hang it in a visible place in the village. In the remaining 
ones (“public information”), a facilitator ensured that three copies of the poster announcing 
the cards and beneficiary list were hung in each hamlet in the village; they also played a 
pre-recorded message about the cards on the mosque loudspeaker.  
Table 7 begins by examining the impact on whether households have seen the 
beneficiary list. In Panel A, for each of four key groups (eligible, non-eligible, village 
officials, and informal leaders), we regress a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
respondent reports having seen the beneficiary list on dummy variables for the cards with 
standard information and the cards with the public information campaign. The “standard” 
card treatment did not significantly increase reports of having seen the list across any of 
the groups. In contrast, the “public information” treatment greatly increased exposure to 
the list: the number of eligible households who had seen it nearly tripled relative to no 
cards (from 7 to 21 percent in Column 1) and was 12 percentage points higher than in the 
standard approach. Ineligibles were 10 percentage points more likely to see it in the public 
versus the standard approach (Column 2), and village leaders were 18 percentage points 
more likely (Column 3).31 
The public information increased knowledge of one’s own eligibility status (Table 
7, Panel B). With no cards, 30 percent of eligible households can correctly identify their 
status; those in villages with just cards are 6 percentage points more likely to correctly 
identify their status relative to no cards (Column 1 of Panel B). With the additional public 
information, they are 6 percentage points more likely to do so relative to just the card alone 
– this is a 40 percent (std. error: 7 percent) increase in knowledge relative to no cards and 
about a 17 percent (std. error: 8 percent) increase relative to the standard card approach. 
With just the cards, ineligibles were no more likely to know their status than under no 
cards, but they were 8 percentage points (or 22 percent (std. error: 8 percent)) more likely 
to know it under public information (Column 2). 
The second mechanism through which the public treatment could have had an effect 
was by changing people’s beliefs about others’ access to information. This may be 
important if challenges to authority feature strategic complementarities: a village head may 
                                                          
31 We coded anyone who reported not knowing whether they had seen the list as not having seen it. In 
Appendix Table 23, we drop those who reported “do not know” and find near identical results. 
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be able to retaliate against a lone individual, but it may be harder to retaliate against a 
group. Thus, a citizen deciding whether to challenge a village head may be more likely to 
do so if he can coordinate with others. However, doing this requires not just knowledge 
about what you are entitled to, but also confidence that everyone else knows more or less 
what they are entitled to as well (Chwe 2001).  
 To test whether higher order beliefs changed, in Table 8, Panel A, we ask all survey 
respondents how likely members of each of the four groups have seen the list, where 0 
corresponds to “have not seen the list” and 3 corresponds to “most have seen it.” 
Individuals under public information were more likely to believe that others had seen the 
list, whereas individuals under standard information were no more likely to report that any 
type of individual had seen it.32 However, despite the fact that more people have seen the 
list, with everyone believing that everyone has more information, respondents were no 
more likely to correctly identify other people’s status in public information than under the 
control (Panel B of Table 8).33  
 Tables 9 and 10 examine the impact of the additional information on program 
outcomes. Eligible households were both more likely to receive their card and to use them 
under public information, with no change for ineligible households (Table 9). The 
magnitude of these differences for eligible households is large: they were 19 percent (std. 
error: 9 percent) more likely to have received a card and 50 percent (std. error: 19 percent) 
more likely to use it than under the standard information.  
 The public information nearly doubled the subsidy increase that eligible households 
received relative to the standard information card villages (Table 10). This difference was 
driven by both an increase in quantity (Column 2) and a decrease in price (Column 3). 
Again, there is no difference in quantity for ineligibles, which implies that the gain is less 
about program resources being diverted from ineligible to eligible, but rather due to a 
decrease in the theft of rice.  
One question is whether the public information worked by simply increasing the 
                                                          
32 If we disaggregate by respondent type (eligible or ineligible), we see that eligible respondents are more 
likely to believe that others have seen the list under standard information, as well (see Appendix Table 24). 
This is consistent with the notion that the standard information treatment primarily gave information to 
eligible households. 
33 As Appendix Table 25 shows, there are not systematic differences between eligible and ineligible 
households. 
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number of cards distributed, or if it had broader effects beyond the receipt of the cards. To 
try to distinguish between these two scenarios, we estimate the implied instrumental 
variables effect of receiving a card in the standard villages and compare this effect to that 
in the public (see Appendix Table 27).34 If the effect of the public treatment was simply 
through increased card receipt, the IV effect should be similar across both sets of villages. 
However, this is not the case: the IV estimate of receiving the card on the subsidy is Rp. 
31,160 in public, while it is Rp. 18,833 in the standard treatment (p-value of difference is 
0.08).35 This implies that the public information had impacts beyond just handing out more 
cards.  
On net, these results suggest that public information, through its combined effect 
on increasing what people know about their own rights and on higher-order knowledge, 
may be an important component of empowerment. 
 
VI. Mechanisms 
The cards greatly increased the amount of subsidy that eligible households received under 
the Raskin program. Here we consider the possible economic mechanisms behind our 
findings. One possibility is that cards changed the nature of bargaining between villagers 
and local officials, so that villagers were able to successfully demand more from local 
officials.  A second possibility is that village officials see the cards as a signal that the 
central government is monitoring them more, encouraging them to comply more with 
program rules. Yet a third possibility is that the cards – and particularly the public treatment 
– somehow reduce stigma associated with the program, leading people to demand more.   
In the subsections that follow we flesh out each of these mechanisms and discuss 
how they fit with the evidence. We also consider a few other possibilities that we argue are 
not consistent with the facts. We conclude that bargaining likely plays an important role, 
though our evidence admits a role for other mechanisms as well. 
                                                          
34 The corresponding first stage and reduced form regressions are presented in Appendix Table 28. 
35 Technically, it is possible that these differences could just reflect a different local average treatment effects 
(LATEs) for the different subpopulations induced to receive the cards under public, but this seems extremely 
unlikely. To see this, note that if the households who received cards under Standard Information continued 
to experience a LATE of 18,833, the 6 percent additional households induced to receive cards under public 
would have to have a LATE of 82,314. While this is in theory possible, this would be very surprising change 
in LATEs. 
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A. Information Effects on Bargaining  
One possible channel is that by providing eligible households with better information, it 
allowed them to better bargain with government officials for their entitlements. To 
determine whether the evidence is consistent with this channel, it is first worth considering 
a simple bargaining model to explore the possible impacts of information on the negotiation 
between the village leader and a Raskin beneficiary over the division of program benefits. 
We lay out the setup and main intuition here; full formal details and results can be found 
in Appendix 2. 
Suppose there is a population of risk-neutral potential beneficiaries of mass 1 
indexed by i, each entitled to a total value of benefits denoted by 𝐵𝐵. The local leader must 
decide how much of these benefits (𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 ∈ [0,𝐵𝐵]) to offer to each potential beneficiary. 
The leader makes a take it or leave it offer to each villager. If the villager accepts, 
he gets 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 and the leader keeps 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘. If the villager does not accept, he has the option of 
complaining to an outside authority at cost 𝐿𝐿. Each villager has a prior 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 on the likelihood 
that he is eligible and, if so, his expected benefits 𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘, conditional on complaining. Both 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 
and 𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 vary by individual, but what is relevant is the distribution of the expected value 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 =
𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘. The leader knows the distribution of beliefs, 𝐿𝐿(𝑌𝑌), but not the 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 of the particular 
villager 𝑖𝑖 with whom he is interacting. For a village head, complaints have both a monetary 
cost and also reduce his future reelection probability.  
We model providing Raskin cards as inducing a shift in beliefs, 𝐿𝐿(𝑌𝑌). This could 
take several possible forms. For example, receiving Raskin cards could lead to a reduction 
in the variance of 𝐿𝐿(𝑌𝑌) for those who receive cards, if people previously had diffuse, but 
correct-on-average, priors about program rules. Alternatively, it could lead to an increase 
in the mean of 𝐿𝐿(𝑌𝑌), if for example government officials misled them about program rules 
(such as the true copay price). It is also possible for mean and variance to change 
simultaneously; for example, if some eligible households did not know they were eligible, 
informing all eligible households they were eligible would increase the mean and reduce 
the variance 𝐿𝐿(𝑌𝑌). 
The model suggests that the impact of increasing information, perhaps surprisingly, 
is ambiguous. In fact, we show that even the effect of an increase in the information 
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available to eligible households on those households can be negative. Consider, for 
example, an increase in mean beliefs, i.e. in the mean of 𝐿𝐿(𝑌𝑌), for eligible households. For 
a given offer from the village head, there are now fewer eligible people accepting the offer, 
which reduces the cost of sweetening the offer to them slightly and pushes towards raising 
X. On the other hand, complaints increase, decreasing the likelihood the village head stays 
in office in the future, and effectively increasing his discount rate because he is less likely 
to be in office to obtain rents in the future. Making him less forward-looking leads the 
official to reduce 𝑋𝑋, which counteracts the previous effect; which of these effects 
dominates is theoretically ambiguous. One can similarly show that the effect of a decrease 
in the variance of 𝐿𝐿(𝑌𝑌) has ambiguous effects on X.  
An important feature of this model is that there are complaints along the equilibrium 
path. This is because the decision to complain is based on the villager’s expectation of what 
he can get by complaining, and the village head does not observe each particular villager’s 
actual expectation, only the population distribution of such expectations. While the village 
head does try to reduce the number of complaints, asymmetric information prevents him 
from doing so perfectly.  
A related characteristic of the model is that complaints do not necessarily go up 
when households are worse off; this is because complaints arise from a disconnect between 
households’ beliefs and what the village head offers them. This means that increasing the 
mean beliefs of eligible villagers can increase the offers that the village head makes to them 
and at the same time increase their complaints, since in general the offer the village head 
makes to the villagers will not increase enough to fully offset the increase in mean beliefs. 
The model also shows that there are potential spillover effects of informing eligible 
households on the outcomes of ineligible households operating through changes in the 
village head’s reelection probabilities. For example, if protests by eligibles go up and 
therefore the village head is less likely to be reelected, he may become more ruthless in 
rejecting the claims of the ineligible villagers. 
The key point from the model is that the impact of even a simple change to 
information is not, ex-ante, as obvious as one might expect. The model also suggests that 
it is useful to look at complaints as separate data-points that are indicative of receiving an 
offer that is poor relative to one’s beliefs, which contains information distinct from just the 
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amount of rice one ends up receiving.  
There are several pieces of evidence in line with the bargaining model. First, the 
model suggests that complaints and protests can change in response to information, even 
on the equilibrium path.  To examine this, we use data we collected on whether there were 
citizen “protests” and whether there were any of four different types of “complaints”: 
complaints from those who receive rice, complaints from those who did not, complaints 
about the beneficiary selection process, and complaints about the distribution process.36  
Table 11 shows that the likelihood of complaints is altered by the cards treatment. 
Specifically, protests increase substantially in card villages (Column 1). Complaints by 
those who do not receive Raskin increase by 8 percentage points in treatment areas – about 
a 36 percent (std. error: 14 percent) rise over the control group mean –while complaints 
fall for those not receiving Raskin rice. The treatment spurs more complaints about the 
beneficiary listing, and fewer complaints about the distribution process.37  This suggests 
that the bargaining relationship between citizens and local officials has changed. 
A second point of evidence in favor of the bargaining story is the fact that printing 
the information about the copay price increased the quantity of rice eligible households 
received, not the price they paid. From the perspective of the bargaining theory outlined 
above, officials and villagers would care only about the total subsidy 𝑋𝑋 that villagers 
receive (the product of the price discount and the quantity), not whether it comes from 
lower prices or higher quantities. Revealing information about the true copay price of 
Raskin (as discussed in Section III C) should increase the total subsidy, but the margin 
through which it does so is arbitrary and depends on which approach is more cost-effective 
for the local leaders. The fact that we find that quantities went up in response to printing 
                                                          
36 Protests generally refer to simultaneous protests by multiple people, whereas complaints are individual. 
Complaints about the beneficiary selection process are comprised of the following specific types of 
complaints: “Process of data collection and selection for program beneficiaries was not transparent,” “There 
was practice of corruption/collusion/nepotism in determining beneficiaries,” “The allocation was not fair,” 
“Aid was given to those who were not suitable to the program,” “Household that used to be eligible for 
Raskin is no longer eligible,” and “The latest Raskin Beneficiary list was not accurate”; complaints about the 
distribution process include: “The amount of aid received was not matched,” “Raskin came late,” “The fee 
was not matched with the regulation,” “The new Raskin quota did not meet the desired amount,” “Location 
of Raskin pick up point was not pleasant,” and “Raskin quality was poor.” 
37 Interestingly, the increase in complaints about the targeting and beneficiary list tend to occur right after the 
intervention, while the decrease in complaints about distribution occur after households have had time to 
update their beliefs on the distribution process (Appendix Table 17). 
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the copay price can be reconciled with a bargaining story if increasing quantities is more 
cost-effective for the leader than lowering prices. This may be the case if it is easier for the 
leaders to discriminate between eligibles and ineligibles on quantities because there may 
be more pressure for a uniform price than for equal quantities.  
Qualitative evidence supports the idea that bargaining between village leaders and 
villagers may be important. For example, a village head we met described a process 
whereby each year, the village would hold a meeting in which he described how Raskin 
rice would be allocated to both eligible and ineligible households. During the meeting, he 
would seek consent of the village for the proposed distribution scheme.38 At the meeting 
he held after the cards had been distributed, however, eligible households refused to 
consent: he said that they knew what they were entitled to and refused to budge, and the 
village head had to deliver the full 15kg to all eligible households from thereon in. 
 
B.  Effects on perceptions of central government monitoring 
An alternative story is that the information campaign simply increases the village officials’ 
beliefs about how important the central government believes following the rules are, and 
how much the central government would be monitoring them on the rules in the future.  
The fact that the price treatment results in increases in quantities provides evidence against 
the idea that the central mechanism is a perception of greater central government 
monitoring: if one thought that by printing the price the government was signaling a higher 
degree of auditing on price, one would expect effects only on price. Other evidence also 
suggests that the results are not driven by perceived higher central government monitoring. 
In particular, we see strong results even 18 months after the cards were implemented, 
despite the fact that there was in fact no change in central government monitoring. If 
monitoring was really the driving force, one might expect a faster decay of the effects of 
the cards once people realized that the monitoring was not happening.  
 
C.  Effects on Stigma 
                                                          
38 This anecdote actually came from a different part of the country, in NTT province, after the national 
scale-up of cards. 
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An alternative explanation for our results is that there is a stigma for receiving social 
programs, and that the cards “normalized” the idea of receiving the program, thereby 
reducing the stigma involved. However, the evidence suggests that this is unlikely. In the 
control group 79 percent of the eligible households were already purchasing Raskin rice, 
just not receiving their full entitlement and/or were paying a higher price; had stigma been 
an issue, we would have seen many fewer households buying Raskin rice to begin with. 
Indeed, Table 2 shows that the treatment only affects the intensive margin of how much 
people buy, not the extensive margin of whether they buy. One would imagine that if 
reducing stigma was the main channel, one would find more results on the extensive 
margin.  
In this context, most households appear to want to be seen as poor rather than rich: 
in the baseline survey, when we asked individuals to assess their poverty level on a ladder 
from 1 (poorest) to 6 (richest), 19% of households list themselves at 1, 50% list themselves 
as either 1 or 2, and about 87% list themselves at 3 or below. In fact, less than 3% of 
households list themselves at 5 or 6, the two richest categories. Thus, it is unlikely that 
stigma was a substantial problem in this context.  
D. Other Explanations 
We also consider several other possible explanations for the effects. One view is 
that villages may have been maximizing a different social welfare function from the central 
government, and therefore, deviated from the program rules to ensure that resources are 
allocated to others. In this view, the cards simply made villages more likely to comply with 
the central government rules, and less likely to maximize resources allocation as they 
choose. While this is possible, it is unlikely to be the main driver of our results: the cards 
did not greatly change who accessed the Raskin program, but did greatly reduce leakages 
(i.e. rice theft). 
Another possible explanation is that the large increases in Raskin quantity we 
observe are actually just a normal demand response to the change in price induced by the 
cards (i.e. cards affected only the price of Raskin, and then households responded to the 
price decline by increasing quantity, as they would with any good). Again, this seems 
unlikely: the Raskin price (even with markups) is already so far below market price that 
most households would want to buy as much as they could, especially since it is possible 
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to resell rice to traders. Moreover, the quantity effects are sufficiently large that the demand 
for rice would need to be very elastic to explain these effects – we calculate that it would 
require a price elasticity of about 10 -- which seems very unlikely for an important staple.39 
It is also worth noting that the outsourcing intervention studied in Banerjee et al. (2015) in 
this context led to a reduction in the price of rice but no essentially increase in quantities, 
lending further evidence against the idea that the effects here are demand effects. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Despite widely-held beliefs about the importance of transparency for improving 
governance, there has been surprisingly little rigorous evidence on its effects on service 
delivery. In this paper, we tested the role of information by providing identification cards 
to eligible beneficiaries of a subsidized food program in Indonesia. Importantly, we varied 
several aspects of the card program to test how providing different information amounts 
and content affected the ultimate outcomes. 
The cards mattered: on average, beneficiaries in villages randomly chosen to 
receive the cards received about 26 percent (std. error: 5 percent) more subsidy than those 
in the control group. The evidence points to a mechanism through which information 
increased citizens’ bargaining power vis-à-vis village officials. In particular, adding a 
single line to the cards with the copay price information printed on it dramatically increased 
the impact of the cards on the amount of subsidy received, but it did so primarily by 
increasing the quantity of rice received as opposed to lowering the copay price paid, 
suggesting that it improved recipients’ ability to bargain with village heads rather than 
leading village heads to comply exactly with program rules. Moreover, publicly posting 
the information about the cards and the beneficiary list further increased the effectiveness 
of the cards. 
The increase in subsidy to eligible households was achieved in a cost-effective 
manner. Overall, the estimated increase in subsidy received by households over the course 
of eighteen months was more than 7 times the cost of the intervention. In fact, the benefits 
of the cards exceed the costs within just two months. Increasing the costs by 30%, or even 
100%, to account for the marginal cost of public funds (Ballard et al. 1985; Devarajan et 
                                                          
39 For example, Case (1991) estimates an elasticity of demand for rice in Indonesia of 0.48. 
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al. 2002; Kleven and Kreiner 2006) does not change the conclusion that such an 
intervention is strongly welfare-improving. It is worth noting that this calculation implicitly 
values the social cost of “leaked” rice (i.e. rents captured by corrupt officials) at zero.
 At some level, the idea that additional information can empower citizens to more 
effectively demand the fulfillment of their rights seems surprising for well-established and 
long-lived programs like Raskin. After all, shouldn’t people already have the information? 
One might have thought that it should not be that hard to learn the rules, particularly general 
ones like how many kilograms of rice you are entitled to and at what price.  
Given that providing this information has significant material benefits, the next 
question is why. There are a number of possible answers: perhaps people simply do not 
know that there are rules – they assume that it is all left to the discretion of the village 
leadership. Perhaps they know that there are rules, but they have the wrong version of the 
rules. Perhaps they know that there are rules but assume that the rules constantly change, 
which is certainly true of some government programs. Understanding the actual reasons 
behind the lack of information in the status quo is both interesting and important, and an 
area we hope to address in future research.  
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Table 1: Effect of Card Treatment on Card Receipt and Use 
 Eligible Households  Ineligible Households 
 
Received 
Card Used Card 
Knows Own 
Status on 
Official List  
Received 




 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Card Treatment 0.30*** 0.15*** 0.09***  0.03** 0.04*** 0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 [<.001] [<.001] [<.001]  [.031] [.006] [.017] 
        
Observations 5,693 5,693 5,691  3,619 3,619 3,619 
Control Group Mean 0.07 0.06 0.30  0.05 0.04 0.36 
P-Value: Eligible vs Ineligible     <0.001 <0.001 0.135 
Note: Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, strata fixed effects, and survey sample dummies. Data are 
pooled from the first and second follow-up surveys. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom decile treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-
weight the treatment group by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same.  Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. 
Randomization inference p-values are in brackets below standard errors.  Randomization inference p-values for testing the equality of the treatment effect on eligibles versus 
ineligibles are shown in the last row. Stars are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2: Effect of Card Treatment on Subsidy 
  Eligible Households  Ineligible Households 
 Bought in 












(Kg) Price (Rp.) 
Subsidy 
(Rp.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Card Treatment 0.02 1.25*** -57*** 7,455***  -0.06*** 0.07 -35 526 
 (0.01) (0.24) (18) (1,328)  (0.02) (0.19) (24) (1,035) 
 [.264] [<.001] [.005] [<.001]  [.024] [.758] [.162] [.669] 
          
Observations 5,693 5,692 4,881 5,692  3,619 3,619 2,283 3,619 
Control Group Mean 0.79 5.29 2,276 28,605  0.63 3.46 2,251 18,754 
P-Value: Eligible vs Ineligible      0.003 <0.001 0.349 <0.001 
Note:  Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, strata fixed effects, and survey sample dummies.  Data are pooled from the first and 
second follow-up survey.  Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom decile treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that 
the ratio of all three income groups is the same.  For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the 
interview occurred before the 25th day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice. 
The price is defined only among purchasing households and is dropped if below Rp. 500 or above Rp. 10,000. Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. 
Randomization inference p-values are in brackets below standard errors.  Randomization inference p-values for testing the equality of the treatment effect on eligibles versus ineligibles are shown in 
the last row. Stars are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Effect of Card Treatment on Subsidy, By Survey Round 
  Eligible Households  Ineligible Households 
 
Bought in the 







Bought in the 







 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A: Survey Round 1 (Approximately 2 months) 
Card Treatment 0.03 1.25*** -23 7,470***  -0.07* -0.13 -16 -683 
 (0.02) (0.35) (23.17) (1,974.78)  (0.04) (0.48) (37.49) (2,669.30) 
 [.157] [.001] [.406] [.001]  [.102] [.8] [.685] [.813] 
Observations 2,225 2,225 1,801 2,225  897 897 519 897 
Control Group Mean 0.79 5.76 2,264.17 32,013.19  0.64 4.11 2,218.22 22,943.87 
P-Value: Eligible vs Ineligible      0.03 0.009 0.905 0.006 
  
 Panel B: Survey Round 2 (Approximately 8 months) 
Card Treatment -0.01 0.71*** -88*** 4,538***  -0.09*** -0.08 -23 -385 
 (0.02) (0.27) (26.38) (1,503.03)  (0.03) (0.17) (33.75) (917.57) 
 [.723] [.017] [.002] [.008]  [.005] [.699] [.538] [.736] 
Observations 1,778 1,778 1,576 1,778  1,756 1,756 1,115 1,756 
Control Group Mean 0.80 4.98 2,299.13 26,197.73  0.62 2.92 2,294.63 15,338.40 
P-Value: Eligible vs Ineligible      0.018 0.025 0.11 0.009 
  
 Panel C: Survey Round 3 (Approximately 18 months) 
Card Treatment -0.01 0.74*** -45** 4,398***  -0.07** -0.04 -20 -121 
 (0.02) (0.27) (18.62) (1,439.84)  (0.03) (0.24) (30.41) (1,201.60) 
 [.566] [.015] [.042] [.007]  [.05] [.873] [.528] [.916] 
Observations 2,944 2,943 2,764 2,943  1,714 1,714 1,196 1,714 
Control Group Mean 0.86 6.33 2,262.55 32,154.76  0.68 4.08 2,290.81 20,540.02 
P-Value: Eligible vs Ineligible      0.087 0.03 0.37 0.018 
          
P-Value of Difference 1 – 2 0.297 0.331 0.139 0.333  0.858 0.684 0.704 0.673 
P-Value of Difference 1 – 3 0.045 0.130 0.891 0.087  0.973 0.796 0.973 0.799 
P-Value of Difference 2 – 3 0.493 0.560 0.092 0.432  0.776 0.759 0.651 0.692 
P-Value of Joint Equality Test  0.200 0.283 0.171 0.198  0.963 0.894 0.885 0.856 
Note:  Each column in each panel of this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, strata fixed effects, and survey sample dummies. We also provide the p-
value of the difference between survey waves, based on randomization inference. Only households sampled using comparable sampling frames in each survey wave are included in each regression. 
Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom decile treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income 
groups is the same.  For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before 
the 25th day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice. The price is defined only 
among purchasing households and is dropped if below Rp. 500 or above Rp. 10,000. Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. Randomization inference p-values are 
in brackets below standard errors.  Randomization inference p-values for testing the equality of the treatment effect on eligibles versus ineligibles are also shown (note that for Column 7, Panel A, this 
is calculated using district*previous treatment, rather than subdistrict*previous treatment, strata). Stars are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Effect on Subsidy of Printing Price on Cards 
 
 Eligible Households  Ineligible Households 
 Bought in 












(Kg) Price (Rp.) 
Subsidy 
(Rp.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cards with Printed Price 0.03 1.17*** -49 6,802***  -0.03 0.12 -43 861 
 (0.03) (0.36) (35) (2,017)  (0.03) (0.28) (34) (1,555) 
 [.287] [.002] [.101] [.002]  [.384] [.673] [.185] [.565] 
Cards without Price 0.02 0.55 -6 3,200*  -0.03 0.14 18 664 
 (0.03) (0.35) (29) (1,935)  (0.03) (0.28) (32) (1,514) 
 [.457] [.136] [.832] [.125]  [.450] [.598] [.579] [.652] 
Difference:          
Price - No Price 0.01 0.62* -43 3,602*  -0.00 -0.02 -62** 197 
 (0.02) (0.35) (28) (1,974)  (0.03) (0.26) (28) (1,436) 
 [.813] [.088] [.156] [.074]  [.954] [.910] [.032] [.879] 
P-Value: Eligible vs Ineligible          
Cards with Printed Price      0.076 0.005 0.861 0.005 
Cards without Price      0.164 0.243 0.416 0.201 
Price - No Price      0.771 0.095 0.482 0.112 
          
Observations 5,688 5,687 4,877 5,687  3,615 3,615 2,281 3,615 
Control Group Mean 0.79 5.29 2,276 28,605  0.63 3.46 2,251 18,754 
Note: Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, strata fixed effects, survey sample dummies, and a dummy for 
whether the village was also in the public information treatment. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey.  Eligible households that did not receive a card under 
the bottom decile treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same.  For each 
household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th 
day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice. The price is 
defined only among purchasing households and is dropped if below Rp. 500 or above Rp. 10,000. Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. 
Randomization inference p-values are in brackets below standard errors.  Randomization inference p-values for testing the equality of the treatment effect on eligibles versus 




- 35 -  
Table 5: Effect of Card Treatment on Subsidy, by Household’s Baseline Consumption 
 
 Eligible Households  Ineligible Households 
 
Bought in 












(Kg) Price (Rp.) 
Subsidy 
(Rp.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Card Treatment -0.02 0.52* -54* 3,175*  -0.09*** 0.01 -42 205 
(0.02) (0.30) (28) (1,622)  (0.03) (0.17) (37) (909) 
 [.601] [.146] [.104] [.089]  [.001] [.982] [.252] [.886] 
Log Consumption 0.00 0.18 -18 950  -0.11*** -0.59*** -17 -3,107*** 
(0.02) (0.21) (19) (1,078)  (0.02) (0.12) (21) (651) 
 [.855] [.353] [.322] [.355]  [.221] [.559] [.389] [.567] 
Treatment x 
Log Consumption 
-0.02 -0.32 33 -1,938  0.02 -0.03 32 -176 
(0.02) (0.29) (24) (1,573)  (0.02) (0.15) (27) (798) 
 [.479] [.283] [.219] [.208]  [.463] [.832] [.278] [.839] 
          
P-Value: Eligible vs Ineligible          
Card Treatment      0.013 0.08 0.715 0.052 
Log Consumption      0.016 0.019 0.993 0.012 
Treatment x Log Consumption      0.174 0.284 0.986 0.216 
          
Observations 1,266 1,266 1,148 1,266  1,925 1,925 1,235 1,925 
Control Group Mean 0.82 5.09 2,313 26,653  0.62 2.99 2,305 15,663 
Note: Each column comes from a separate OLS regression and includes strata fixed effects and survey sample.  The sample is a group of households in the second follow-up for 
whom we have baseline consumption data.  Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom decile treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the 
treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same.  For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages 
over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The amount and 
subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice. The price is defined only among purchasing households and is dropped if below Rp. 500 or above 
Rp. 10,000. Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. Randomization inference p-values are in brackets below standard errors.  Randomization 
inference p-values for testing the equality of the treatment effect on eligibles versus ineligibles are also shown. Stars are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. 
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Table 6: Effect of Distributing Cards Only to the Bottom Decile on Subsidy 



































 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Cards to Bottom 
Decile 
0.03 0.75** -46** 4,536**  0.03 0.14 -10 1,049  -0.02 0.03 -15 231 
(0.02) (0.34) (23) (1,907)  (0.02) (0.34) (30) (1,923)  (0.03) (0.25) (28) (1,374) 
[.187] [.068] [.116] [.043]  [.340] [.714] [.775] [.627]  [.587] [.926] [.655] [.880] 
Cards to All 0.01 0.75* -44* 4,694**  -0.01 0.80** -56* 4,997***  -0.06** 0.03 -7 248 
(0.02) (0.39) (25) (2,208)  (0.02) (0.34) (30) (1,931)  (0.03) (0.27) (31) (1,482) 
[.625] [.071] [.134] [.040]  [.756] [.038] [.100] [.027]  [.079] [.923] [.847] [.873] 
Difference:               
Bottom Decile – 
All 
0.02 0.00 -1 -158  0.03* -0.67** 46* -3,948**  0.04 0.00 -8 -17 
(0.02) (0.35) (22) (1,979)  (0.02) (0.31) (26) (1,765)  (0.03) (0.22) (25) (1,219) 
[.358] [.999] [.946] [.957]  [.145] [.073] [.126] [.056]  [.209] [.998] [.774] [.988] 
P-Value: vs 
Bottom Decile 
              
Cards to Bottom 
Decile 
     0.811 0.055 0.146 0.049  0.109 0.085 0.328 0.065 
Cards to All      0.464 0.870 0.655 0.877  0.051 0.114 0.296 0.083 
Difference      0.565 0.022 0.031 0.019  0.564 0.999 0.846 0.949 
P-Value: vs Other 
Eligible 
              
Cards to Bottom 
Decile 
          0.205 0.778 0.865 0.698 
Cards to All           0.156 0.045 0.140 0.030 
Difference           0.895 0.088 0.053 0.071 
               
Observations 3,683 3,683 3,189 3,683  2,968 2,967 2,507 2,967  3,619 3,619 2,283 3,619 
Control Group 
Mean 0.80 5.37 2,280 29,015  0.78 5.09 2,263 27,566  0.63 3.45 2,251 18,692 
Note: Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, strata fixed effects, survey sample dummies, and a dummy for whether the 
village was also in the public information treatment.  For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is 
dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not 
purchase any Raskin rice. The price is defined only among purchasing households and is dropped if below Rp. 500 or above Rp. 10,000. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up 
survey. Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. Randomization inference p-values are in brackets below standard errors. Randomization inference p-values 
for testing the equality of treatment effect on eligibles versus ineligibles are also shown.  Stars are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Effect of Public Information Treatment on Seeing the Eligibility List  
 
 
Eligible Ineligible Village officials 
Informal 
Leaders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Respondent of type […] has seen the list 
Public Information 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.24*** 0.12*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) 
 [<.001] [<.001] [<.001] [.012] 
Standard Information 0.02* 0.01 0.05 -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) 
 [.147] [.723] [.362] [.853] 
Difference:     
Public - Standard 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.18*** 0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) 
 [<.001] [<.001] [.001] [.010] 
     
     Observations 5,685 3,619 496 385 
Control Group Mean 0.07 0.06 0.36 0.12 
     Panel B:  Respondent of type […] correctly knows whether respondent is on list or not 
Public Information 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.25*** 0.00 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
 [<.001] [.001] [<.001] [.977] 
Standard Information 0.06*** 0.01 0.14*** -0.02 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
 [.014] [.618] [.009] [.812] 
Difference:     Public - Standard 0.06** 0.07*** 0.11** 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
 [.030] [.009] [.036] [.778] 
     
     Observations 5,683 3,619 496 385 
Control Group Mean 0.30 0.36 0.44 0.48 
Note: Each regression is estimated by OLS and includes strata fixed effects and survey sample dummies. In Panel A, the 
sample is the stated category in the column and the outcome is a dummy indicating whether the individual has seen the 
eligibility list. “Do not know” answers are coded as zero (not seen).  In Panel B, the sample is restricted to the stated 
category in the column header.  The outcome is whether the respondent household correctly identifies its own status.  “Do 
not know” answers are coded as zero.  Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Standard errors (in 
parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. Randomization inference p-values are in brackets below standard 
errors.  Stars are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Testing for Changes in High Order Beliefs 
 
Eligible Ineligible Village officials 
Informal 
Leaders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Respondent believes that the […] category of individuals has seen the list 
Public Information 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 [<.001] [<.001] [<.001] [<.001] 
Standard Information 0.08** 0.02 0.04 0.05 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) 
 [.096] [.631] [.454] [.259] 
Difference:     Public - Standard 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 [<.001] [<.001] [<.001] [.001] 
     
Observations 9,304 9,304 9,304 9,304 
Control Group Mean 0.31 0.15 1.04 0.47 
 
Panel B:  Respondent correctly identifies status of other households of […] type 
Public Information -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.03 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) 
 [.621] [.38] [.958] [.347] 
Standard Information -0.00 0.03** 0.03 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
 [.842] [.045] [.438] [.937] 
Difference:     Public - Standard -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
 [.774] [.228] [.403] [.431] 
     
     Observations 64,540 34,757 4,155 4,215 
Control Group Mean 0.66 0.32 0.60 0.63 
Note:  Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the public information 
treatments, strata fixed effects, survey sample dummies. Panel A includes all survey respondents. The outcome varies from 
0 to 3, where 0 corresponds to “have not seen the list” and 3 corresponds to “most have seen the list”; “Do not know” 
answers are coded as zero.  In Panel B, the respondents include all individuals (regardless of income group).  The 
outcome is whether the individual correctly identifies other households in their village within each of the categories 
listed in the columns. “Do not know” answers are coded as zero. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up 
survey. Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. Randomization inference p-values 
are in brackets below standard errors.  Stars are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Effect of Public Information Treatment on Card Receipt and Use 
 
 Eligible Households  Ineligible Households 
 Received 
Card Used Card  
Received 
Card Used Card 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Public Information 0.31*** 0.18***  0.03* 0.04*** 
 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.02) 
 [<.001] [<.001]  [.054] [.013] 
Standard Information 0.25*** 0.10***  0.03** 0.04** 
 (0.03) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) 
 [<.001] [<.001]  [.038] [.015] 
Difference:      
Public - Standard 0.06* 0.08***  -0.00 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) 
 [.072] [.007]  [.944] [.925] 
      
P-Value: Eligible vs Ineligible      
Public Information    <0.001 <0.001 
Standard Information    <0.001 0.001 
Public - Standard    0.062 0.002 
      
Observations 5,685 5,685  3,619 3,619 
Control Group Mean 0.07 0.06  0.05 0.04 
Note:  Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, 
strata fixed effects, and survey sample dummies, from the first and second follow-up survey.  Eligible households 
randomized under the bottom decile treatment not to receive cards are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the 
treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same.  Standard errors (in parentheses 
below coefficient) are clustered by village. Randomization inference p-values are in brackets below standard errors.  
Randomization inference p-values for testing the equality of the treatment effect on eligibles versus ineligibles are also 
shown. Stars are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Effect of Public Information Treatment on Subsidy 
 
 Eligible Households  Ineligible Households 
 
Bought in 












(Kg) Price (Rp.) 
Subsidy 
(Rp.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Public Information 0.01 1.64*** -81*** 9,666***  -0.08*** 0.12 -46 764 
 (0.02) (0.30) (26) (1,703)  (0.03) (0.24) (30) (1,293) 
 [.618] [<.001] [.001] [<.001]  [.003] [.611] [.113] [.539] 
Standard Information 0.02 0.83*** -24 4,839***  -0.03 0.10 -19 623 
 (0.02) (0.31) (29) (1,764)  (0.03) (0.25) (30) (1,347) 
 [.349] [.012] [.360] [.010]  [.377] [.695] [.511] [.641] 
Difference:          
Public - Standard -0.01 0.81** -58** 4,827**  -0.06* 0.02 -27 140 
 (0.02) (0.36) (28) (2,031)  (0.03) (0.26) (30) (1,419) 
 [.717] [.040] [.034] [.032]  [.068] [.931] [.370] [.917] 
          
P-Value: Eligible vs Ineligible          
Public Information      0.001 <0.001 0.166 <0.001 
Standard Information      0.081 0.018 0.863 0.017 
Public - Standard      0.132 0.048 0.289 0.036 
          
Observations 5,685 5,684 4,873 5,684  3,619 3,619 2,283 3,619 
Control Group Mean 0.79 5.29 2,276 28,605  0.63 3.46 2,251 18,754 
Note:  Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, strata fixed effects, and survey sample dummies. We also 
provide the difference in the two card treatments. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom decile treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight 
the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same.  For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages 
over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The amount and 
subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice. The price is defined only among purchasing households and is dropped if below Rp. 500 or above 
Rp. 10,000. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey.  Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. Randomization inference p-
values are in brackets below standard errors.  Randomization inference p-values for testing the equality of the treatment effect on eligibles versus ineligibles are also shown. Stars 
are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Effect of Card Treatment on Protests and Complaints 
 





those who receive 
rice 
“Complaints” by 




list of beneficiaries 
“Complaints” about 
distribution process 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Card Treatment 0.07***  -0.09*** 0.08***  0.08*** -0.06** (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03)         [.003]  [.002] [.006]  [.007] [.052] 
        
Observations 1,143  1,144 1,144  1,144 1,144 Control Group Mean 0.11  0.43 0.22  0.18 0.41 
Note: Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, strata fixed effects, and survey wave indicator. Data are pooled 
from village leader module of the first and second follow-up surveys. Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficient) are clustered by village. Randomization inference p-values 
are in brackets below standard errors.  Stars are based on standard (not randomization inference) p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Experimental Design 
 
    Cards Subtreatments 
 
  Information Type  Printed Price  Coupons 
  Total  Standard Public  Yes No  Yes No 
No Cards 194          
Cards to All 190  94 96  95 95  95 95 
Cards to Bottom Decile 188  92 96  92 96  94 94 
Total Villages 572  186 192  187 191  189 189 
Note: This table lists the total number of villages randomly assigned to each of the treatments. 
 
Figure 2: Raskin Cards with and without price 
A: With Price 
 
B: Without Price 
 
 
Note: Figure 2A shows English translations of example Raskin cards with the printed price; Figure 2B 
shows the Raskin cards without the price printed. Original versions in Indonesian are available in the 
Appendix as Appendix Figure 3.  
 
- 43 -  






Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
 
Jan Feb Mar Apr 
Government Mails Listing to Local Officials   
          Government Mails Cards 
 
  
         Public Information Treatment Conducted 
  
    
       First Follow-Up 
   
    
      Second Follow-Up                       
              
